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Routine Activities in a Virtual Space:
A Taiwanese Case of an ATM Hacking Spree
Ming-Li Hsieh1
University of Wisconsin-Eau Claire, United States of America
Shun-Yung Kevin Wang2
University of South Florida St. Petersburg, United States of America
Abstract
Routine activity theory (RAT) was initially proposed to explain shifts in urban crime rates in the late
1970s, and has subsequently been applied to predictions of predatory criminal or victimization events.
Despite a number of studies attempting to apply RAT to the vast array of crimes now taking place in
a virtual environment such as phishing, fraud, malware infection, identify theft, computer viruses and
cyber stalking on the Internet in Western countries, little is known about whether RAT could address
automatic teller machine (ATM) hacking in an Asian setting. The current study applies RAT in
order to examine a high-profile case of European hackers programming ATMs in Taipei to “spit out”
cash netting the thieves $2.6 million dollars. The results indicate that the Taiwanese case is well
covered by the doctrine of RAT. Moreover, this study bolstered the neo-ideology of “cannikin law”
within cyber crime, in which the effectiveness of cyber security and levels of risk would depend on the
magnitude of guardianship (in reference to the idea that any protection measure is only being as strong
as its weakest link).
________________________________________________________________________
Keywords: Routine Activity Theory, White Collar Crime, Cyber Crime, Cyber Security.
Introduction
Since the first web browser appeared online in the early 1990s, the growth of the
Internet and related modern information technology has escalated dramatically. Human
activities today transmit valuable information in cyberspace where the Internet is a fast,
open, omnipresent ecosystem with content-rich service and without geographical
boundaries (International Telecommunication Union [ITU], 2016). Accompanied with
widely available Wi-Fi and telecommunication systems allowing users to access the
Internet through a wide variety of devices, a seemingly limitless amount of digital
information can now be easily and quickly transferred from one end of the world to the
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other (Britz, 2013). Despite its origins within the Department of Defense’s DARPA
project for the purpose of securing communications within the military, the Internet has
become an essential part of ordinary people’s daily lives across international borders. For
example, on average, 89 percent of people in the United States use the Internet every day,
followed by Europe (80), the Middle East (72), Latin America (64) and Asian/Pacific
countries (58) (PEW, 2017). The Internet, a “network of networks” (Castells, 2002), has
expanded individual and group users’ physical surroundings to include virtual activities,
including communications, information distribution, entertainment, education, and
business investment and transactions.
Arguably, cyberspace is not inherently evil but opportunities afforded by a virtual
environment may fuel the illegitimate network life of cyber crime. When valuable
financial and banking transactions are linked with tremendous business profits from the
web, each segment of the transaction can become a target of criminals’ rational choice.
These systems have few deterrent factors or social control mechanisms, and as a result,
motivated offenders are provided with a number of alternatives for committing cyber
crimes that may not necessarily require sophisticated skills, opportunities and means
(Jaishankar, 2008). The convenience of the Internet is like a magnet that attracts more
personal devices, critical infrastructure (e.g., energy, transportation), and even life-saving
equipment (e.g., pacemakers) to interact on the information “superhighway”, and the
Internet of Things (IoT) is one of the converging trends reflecting the growth of interconnected networks (Singer & Friedman, 2013). Potential victims, lacking adequate
protection, converge with offenders in cyberspace and expose themselves to high levels of
security risk. Further, cyberspace provides complete dissociative anonymity and invisibility
relative to the traditional physical space for motivated offenders (Jaishankar, 2008). These
elements can all be attributed to the significant rise of cyber crime.
Cyber attacks have now become the second-most reported economic crime; one that
affects 32 percent of organizations and is responsible for losses averaging over one million
dollars per incident (PWC, 2016). Globally, cyber crime cost the world $3 trillion in
2015. There is no doubt that the cost will continue to increase and is projected to climb
to 6 trillion annually by 2021 (Cybersecurity Ventures, 2017). At the individual level,
from 2012 to 2016, there have been 1.4 million cases of cyber crime reported to the FBI,
and a total reported loss of $4.63 billion across types of cyber victimization such as data
breaches, phishing, identity theft, harassment, fraud, varied malware, extortion, and
advanced fee frauds (FBI, 2017).3
Given that various forms of cyber crime have been acknowledged as some of the
biggest threats to individuals and businesses (Cybersecurity Ventures, 2017), criminologists
have attempted to understand the nature of cyber crime, the characteristics of cyber
criminals, and to enhance cyber crime control and prevention. Although proposed decades
ago, routine activity theory (RAT) by Cohen and Felson (1979) has not only been
proffered as an explanation for contemporary cyber crime and “virtual criminality”
primarily in Western countries (Grabosky, 2001; Leukfeldt & Yar, 2016), but also has
3

The FBI is traditionally not a good source of data about cyber crime, as their numbers generally
under estimate the seriousness of cyber crimes. IC3 collects “complaint” data, but many harmful
crimes like identity theft, for example, are reported to the FTC where victims would be advised to
also report to local police, credit bureaus, and bank/financial institutions.
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been widely applied to cyber victimizations such as fraud (Pratt, Holtfreter, & Reisig,
2010; van Wilsem, 2013), phishing (Hutchings & Hayes, 2009; Leukfeldt, 2014; Paek &
Nalla, 2015), identify theft (Reyns, 2013), malware infection (Holt & Bossler, 2009,
2013), and stalking (Reyns, Henson, & Fisher, 2011).
Currently, little is known about whether RAT could address a new form of logical
attacks4 against automatic teller machines (ATM) (so-called ATM hacking) in Asian
settings. Before generating new theories with a specific focus on the “novelty” of cyber
crime, as Yar (2005) noted, researchers need to assess to what extent that RAT can be
applied to crimes in virtual space by expanding its explanatory power to studies of varied
types of cyber crime and victimization. Therefore, the current study seeks to fill the
literature gap in RAT by examining a recent high-profile cyber crime case involving
European hackers who targeted ATMs in Taiwan. This case study contributes to the field
by highlighting legal documents, case reports and interviews with the primary cyber crime
investigator and forensic analysts in Taiwan. The paper begins with an articulation of the
criminological framework, followed by the details of a recent criminal case of ATMs that
were targeted by a group of organized criminals via the Internet. Finally, policy
implications about cyber security improvement and crime prevention are discussed.
Cyber crime Victimization and Routine Activity Theory
Since the publication of Cohen and Felson’s (1979) routine activity theory, which was
initially proposed to understand patterns and upward trends of predatory criminal events in
the historical context of changing economy, the theory has been applied to a wide
spectrum of victimization experiences such as victimization in the workplace
(Wooldredge, Cullen, & Latessa, 1992), theft (Argun, & Dağlar, 2016), larceny (Mustaine,
& Tewksbury, 1998), burglary (Argun, & Dağlar, 2016; Breetzke & Cohn, 2013;
Louderback & Roy, 2018), fraud (Holtfreter, Reisig, & Pratt, 2008), robbery (Groff,
2007; Louderback & Roy, 2018; Spano, & Nagy, 2005), vandalism (Tewksbury, &
Mustaine, 2000), and aggravated assault (Louderback & Roy, 2018). Researchers in cyber
criminology have argued that the conventional elements of RAT could be adopted to
explain cyber victimization facilitated or commissioned by varied means of information
technology (Grabosky, 2001; Leukfeldt & Yar, 2016).
Briefly, for a crime to occur, RAT purports that three essential elements must be
present: likely offenders, suitable targets, and the absence of capable guardians (Cohen &
Felson, 1979). The theory is not primarily interested in understanding an offender’s
motivation but rather focuses on the characteristics of crime where “the spatio-temporal
organization of social activities helps people to translate their criminal inclinations into
action” (Cohen & Felson, 1979, p. 589). Offenses become a viable alternative in social
situations structured by the legitimate daily routines in which property and/or people
appear to be attractive targets for those who are motivated. It is an interdependent
relationship between the predispositions for committing offenses, target suitability derived
from routine legitimate activities and the degree of inadequate protection and supervision
provided by guardians at all levels. Lacking one of these elements the crime is less likely to
take place, however, Cohen and Felson (1979) further indicated that increasing the
opportunity of enjoying rewards and benefits obtained from illegal activities could also
4

A series of sophisticated actions that may involve using malicious software, hardware, or a
combination of both, to commit crimes against ATMs.
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enhance the propensity for predatory violations. Given the substantial rise in economic
cyber crime and new varieties of cyber victimization as well as the grand scale of financial
losses (Levi, 2017), criminologists have attempted to understand the ecological niche of
cyber crime, specifically those aspects of cyber accessibility associated with subjects,
approaches, time and location in a virtual space.
Motivated Offenders
Although it has been argued that RAT might not directly apply to the structure of
cyberspace as it often appears disorganized temporally and spatiality in the virtual
environment (see Yar, 2005), for a cyber crime to take place studies have found that the
basic components of RAT must be present (Taylor, Caeti, Loper, Fritsch, & Liederbach,
2006; Bossler & Holt, 2009; Holt & Bossler, 2009, 2013; Hutchings & Hayes, 2009). Still,
almost everyone would agree that there are “motivated offenders” out there seeking
appropriate opportunities to commit offenses which is a required element in
understanding all types of crime (Cohen & Felson, 1979) including cyber crime (Taylor
et al., 2006; Bossler & Holt, 2009; Holt & Bossler, 2009, 2013; Hutchings & Hayes,
2009).
Although the very nature of cyberspace allows perpetrators not to be physically close to
potential victims in order to compromise victims’ computers and, more importantly, the
information/data stored on them (Taylor et al., 2006; Eck & Clarke, 2003), there are
spatial properties in the virtual world that can be identified as partially congruent with
physical space (Yar, 2005). To initiate a hack and calculate the spatio-temporal “timing,
tempo and rhythm” (see Hawley, 1950) of launching an attack, for instance, offenders
might linger in cyberspace waiting for any infected tools to be “clicked” by online users in
order to invade a user’s device. Malware is a typical way to open the “backdoor” of an
information system for hackers in a cyber attack, after the inception of social engineering
(Mitnick, 2001). To best increase the exposure of prospective victims, “offenders will
attempt to keep their files active and circulating for as long as possible” in any cyber
location (e.g. email attachments, social media sites, web pages, online advertisement, chat
rooms, portals) and “victims [would] play an active role” in initiating hidden malware
(Holt & Bossler, 2013, p. 423). In this sense, the likelihood of victimization depends on
the degree to which a victim’s online behavior is virtually proximate to a perpetrator’s
programmed malware, such as computer viruses, worms, Trojan horses, ransomware,
spyware, and other malicious codes (Bossler & Holt, 2009; Holt & Bossler, 2013).
Similarly, to deceive potential victims, bogus websites with embedded malware that have
to constantly change online addresses (before being detected and shut down) often are
facilitated by messages with hyperlinks to shorten the virtual distance.
Hutchings and Hayes (2009) indicated that online banking and computer use are risk
factors for phishing victimization. Internet users who engage in the most online banking
are more likely to be attacked by motivated offenders even though their computers and
other devices have been protected by some level of a firewall. Users who engage in
computer deviance such as using pirated software and media, visiting pornographic sites
and viewing obscene materials many of which mimic “hacker-like” behaviors (see Rogers,
2001) would increase the chance of being targeted while online (Holt & Bossler, 2009).
Another study revealed that users who access high speed Internet in order to take
advantage of prompt sharing and connectivity in disseminating information are more likely
336
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to be victimized in some way by cyber perpetrators (Hinduja, 2001). As these examples
illustrate with just a few “clicks” on the Internet, prospective victims can be redirected to
virtual locations that place users in much closer proximity to cyber criminals (Yar, 2005).
In other words, users’ online activities with their IP addresses might signal their “cyber
locations” and show in-use devices or systems that are potentially vulnerable to online
perpetrators.
Suitable Targets
A suitable target can be “a person, an object or a place”, and an assessment of that
subject depends on cumulatively weighted factors (e.g. visibility, value, accessibility)
which might attract offenders to commit an offense (Argun, & Dağlar, 2016, p.
1189).Although offenders would interpret suitable targets differently, in general for
offenders, a suitable target would increase the likelihood of “gain” (e.g. benefits, profit,
value, ego satisfaction and achievement) and the possible rewards of illegal activities would
outweigh the potential punishment and consequences (Argun, & Dağlar, 2016; Bossler &
Holt, 2009).
Yar (2005, p. 419) indicated that “valuation of targets” is a crucial factor for cyber
crime. Criminals can commit a wide array of different cyber crimes, ranging from
compromising and damaging computer systems, stealing personal and organizational data
and intellectual property, stalking and harassing Internet users, to intervening in online
services for trading, selling, and exchanging services, but these targets in cyberspace are
informational in nature. To criminals, high value and portability are desirable target
characteristics, and those found in cyberspace are nearly “weightless”. Selecting suitable
individuals or organizations in cyberspace with higher levels of vulnerability is necessary
for obtaining a greater likelihood of “hit rates” with respect to lucrative rewards, financial
gains or other malicious purposes.
In terms of victimization, Internet users with certain characteristics or habits have
created opportunities for perpetrators to reach them. A large pool of suitable targets are
older, with inadequate account and payment settings (Holtfrete & Mears, 2015), low selfcontrol and a tendency to engage in remote shopping (Reisig & Holtfreter, 2013). Reyns
(2013) examined risk factors for identity theft victimization and determined that those
who are male, older, have a higher income and exhibit routine online behaviors, such as
using instant messaging, e-mail, downloading (e.g. podcasts, music, films), buying products
or services online, and managing finances online through online banking systems, are
more likely to be victimized. For consumer fraud victimization, Internet users’
socioeconomic backgrounds would affect their online activities, and those who spend
more time surfing the net (Pratt et al., 2010), consuming online (Pratt et al., 2010; van
Wilsem, 2013) and visiting online forums (e.g. Facebook or other social media sites) (van
Wilsem, 2013) are at greater risk of being targeted by fraudsters.
In another example of target suitability, a prospective victim’s online personal
information such as social media or instant messenger IDs, or e-mail can be sufficient for
perpetrators to pursue attacks, however, some relatively private personal information (e.g.
photos, videos, sexual orientation, gender, relationship status) could also be valuable to
offenders and might make targets more desirable than other targets without the traits listed
above (Reyns et al., 2011). Marcum, Higgins and Ricketts (2010) revealed that high
school students who spend more time in chat rooms and provide more personal or in
depth information (e.g. demographic background, school, family status, pictures,
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emotions, activities, sexual preferences) online are at higher risk of receiving sexual
solicitations. This study also indicated that college students who have received unwanted
sexually explicit materials were more likely to have posted personal profile and daily life
information on social networking and were communicating with people via their
electronic devices and the Internet. All of these online activities appear to be related to
making oneself a more attractive target to offenders.
Absence of Capable Guardians
Cohen and Felson (1979: 605) argued that a lack of effective social control and
punishment mechanisms would result in an increase “in the certainty, celerity and value of
rewards to be gained from illegal predatory acts” which may result in more predatory
crime taking place. In a similar vein, without capable guardianship in cyberspace, whether
it is at the governmental level, organizational level or individual level, there is an increase
of likelihood for illegal gains and the propensity for victimization (Bossler & Holt, 2009;
Marcum, Higgins, & Ricketts, 2010; Reyns et al., 2011; Williams, 2016). Cyber
guardianship ranges widely from informal guardians (e.g. in-house network administrators,
ethical private and public computer users) to formal guardians (e.g. firewalls, anti-virus
software, IT staff, severity monitors and supervisors). Furthermore, whether the guardian
is willing to supervise and intervene when necessary, as well as able to detect potential
offenders, is practically important (Reynald, 2010). All of these efforts are critical for
deterring potential criminals and controlling and preventing the convergence of motivated
offenders and suitable targets in cyberspace (Yar, 2005).
Despite the argument that there is no significant effectiveness in the use of email filters
(Hutchings & Hayes, 2009) and physical computer guardianship (Holt & Bossler, 2009),
Williams (2016) found that those online users who were less likely to adopt passive
physical guardianship measures such as using an email filtering system, installing anti-virus
browsing and using only one computer were 1.32 times more likely to be victimized.
Moreover, those less likely to be victims of identity theft were those more likely to use
avoidance personal guardianship, for instance, spending less time online and doing less
shopping and banking online. Another study showed that temporal guardians such as
having a friend visible in a place where the Internet is being used and using it in places
(e.g. living room, school computer lab) where there is some level of guardianship reduces
the likelihood of receiving online sexually explicit material and receiving online
harassment, respectively (Marcum et al., 2010).
In addition, routine high risk online behavior may also include using unguarded
networks through connecting to any public Wi-Fi (e.g. airport, subways, coffee shops,
bus, restaurants, hotels). In other words, individuals often put themselves at greater risk of
being hacked without realizing it. As Reyns (2013) explains typing sensitive information
(e.g. social security number, account numbers, passwords, banking information, credit
cards) while connected to a Wi-Fi network without adequate cyber security protection
allows motivated perpetrators who are in the same time and space (on the same network)
to find opportunities to penetrate computers and access personal data.
In summary, a number of studies have adopted RAT to explain cyber crime across
types of victimization and support the concept of the convergence in time and space of
motivated offenders, suitable targets and the absence of capable guardians that leads to
crimes occurring in cyberspace (Choi, 2008; Holt & Bossler, 2009, 2013; Hutchings &
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Hayes, 2009; Leukfeldt, 2014; Marcum et al., 2010; Ngo & Paternoster, 2011; Paek &
Nalla, 2015; Pratt et al., 2010; Reyns, 2013, 2015; Reyns et al., 2011; van Wilsem, 2013).
Despite a consensus of support for this approach, arguments of applicability may remain
(see Leukfeld & Yar, 2016; Yar, 2005) as little is known about whether the RAT could be
applied to ATM hacking and whether the three RAT elements could be used in an Asian
setting. Therefore, the current study examines a recent Taiwanese high-profile cyber
crime case and extends the utility of RAT to Taiwanese cyber crime.
A Case of Cyber Crime
The current study focuses on a First Commercial Bank (FCB) ATM heist case in
Taiwan using RAT elements. This study contributes to the field of cyber crime by
examining legal documents, investigations and analysis reports. Moreover, the current
study interviews a computer crime forensic analyst who is a senior special agent in the
Ministry of Justice Investigation Bureau (MJIB).5
Analytic Plan
Besides examining both public and unpublished case documents6, researchers obtained
the approval of IRB, and contacted the MJIB agents for interviews concerning the FCB
case. After receiving an explanation of the research purposes and reviewing the interview
questions, the primary investigator (S)7 signed the informed consent form and agreed to
share his insights and perspectives on cyber crime.
Case Profile: FCB ATMs Hacking in Taiwan
On 11 July, 2016, international cyber criminals targeting ATMs in Taiwan shocked
authorities with a quick and sophisticated strike. The cyber attack involved an Eastern
European organized crime group consisting of 22 suspects (code-named “Cobalt”)8 from 8
countries and targeted one particular type of ATM (PC 1500XE) manufactured by
Wincor Nixdorf International which was adopted by financial businesses globally (Taipei
District Prosecutors Office [TDPO], 2016). The unknown attackers hacked 41 ATMs at
22 branches of the FCB, programmed the system to dispense cash as “jack potted” slot
machines, and arranged mules to collect a total of NT $83.27 million dollars in cash
(approximately US $2.63 million dollars). On 17 July, 2016, three mules were
apprehended by the police in Taiwan and TDPO issued an arrest warrant for the
remaining 19 suspects who had fled. Later in September, the TDPO charged the mules
with multiple criminal offenses against computer security and recommended a 12-yearsentence for each offender.9

5

MJIB in Taiwan is equivalent to the FBI in the United States.
Although Tai-Wei Chou, cyber crime section chief at MJIB did not receive our interview,
detailed study notes of the crime’s reconstruction and the modus operandi are provided.
7
Given confidentiality concerns, this study used “S” to refer to the investigator’s statements
throughout the manuscript.
8
Hackers used a publicly available security program (i.e. Cobalt Strike) to penetrate the bank’s
networks (Sancho, Huq & Michenzi, 2017).
9
Taiwan has adopted collegial panels for use in the legal system. A collegial panel is composed of
three to five judges depending on the level of the court.
6
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Figure 1. Network of FCB ATM Jackpotting

The modus operandi utilized by the Cobalt group to penetrate the FCB network,
according to Tai-Wei Chou, cyber crime section chief at MJIB, can be broken down into
five significant steps (see Figure 1). First, digital forensics show that this incident began
with an IP address in Switzerland on May 31, 2016. Hackers penetrated FCB’s branch in
London, accessed the banks’ voice recording system, and successfully stole an
administrator’s credentials in order to infiltrate the FCB’s Intranet. Second, after
compromising the voice recording system, hackers dispatched five executable files related
to cash-dispensing (cnginfo.exe, cngdisp.ex, and cngdisp_new.exea) and trace-wiping
(cleanup.bat and sdelete.exe) on the NCR server. Third, by using credentials obtained
from the London branch, a hacker also remotely breached the administrator’s account and
compromised employees’ computers in Taiwan’s FCB’s headquarters. This deeper
penetration gave the hackers remote control over application server (AP) frameworks.
Fourth, when the AP servers were taken over, hackers could upload and deliver fake
package files (with the filename extension “.DMS”) that are only recognized by ATMs for
updating programs. After the ATMs finished updating with the disguised software, the
ATMs would turn on a telnet service that enables a connection between remote
computers and computers within the ATMs and also builds a file transfer protocol (FTP)
connection which allowed ATMs to download pre-installed executable files from the
NCR server. Hackers completed deployment on July 4, 2016 and arranged mules to
approach designated ATMs from July 9 to July 11, 2016. At the day of the attack, the
mules contacted hackers who remotely controlled the ATMs via telnet service and
340
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downloaded and executed the programs for cash dispensing and digital footprint removal
through an FTP connection.
Notably, the FCB incident was well orchestrated and coordinated, and offenders played
specific roles to complete an array of different tasks. In addition to the hackers, 14 bagmen
were responsible for multiple detailed tasks such as standing sentry, withdrawing cash from
ATMs, bagging the cash, transporting money, transferring and hiding the cash. To avoid
detection by law enforcement, criminals changed lodgings, used burner phones with
disposable numbers and SIM cards, and rotated the stolen cash around different hotel
rooms, car trunks, luggage, and even in public lockers at the Taipei mass rapid transit
(MRT) station.
Cover ups are not uncommon in cyber incidents, especially for financial institutions
and corporations because of their concerns for their business reputation in the industry,
working relations with the administration, and potential psychological impacts on
customers. In this case, however, FCB decided to work with the authorities. Because of
the mass media coverage after the ATMs were looted, citizens were able to identify
suspects and report their suspicious behaviors standing in front of ATMs with backpacks,
in turn, leading to the arrest of three bagmen.
Discussion
This high profile Taiwanese case raised considerable national and international attention
for several reasons. First, even though Taiwan is one of dozens of ATM jackpotting cases
committed by similar methods and allegedly the same Eastern European gang (e.g.
Estonia, Malaysia, Thailand, Britain, Russia, Spain, Poland) (Finkle, & Wu, 2017), Taiwan
is the first state to arrest, prosecute and convict three members of the Cobalt group
(Liberty Times, 2016). Second, the case was closed not only by sentencing the criminals
for an average 4.8 year term of imprisonment but also, authorities recovered more than 90
percent of the stolen money (approximately is 2.4 million US dollars) within a few days.
Third, this case highlights the Taiwanese authority’s effectiveness in cyber crime
investigation and computer forensics. The FCB incident also initiated the realization that
cyber criminals could be brought to justice if authorities could dominate the intelligence
race. For this to occur, cyber crime investigators must have the tools to detect hidden and
potential cyber attacks that develop through rapidly innovated hacking techniques. Success
also involves the ability to obtain good evidence, and effectively employ courtroom
workgroups (see Eisenstein, & Jacob, 1977) that clearly understand cyber crime.
Additionally, this case provided insightful information about how criminals utilize
cyber attack techniques to rob banks in the era of the Internet. The experience of
Taiwan’s FCB in this case can be considered a useful lesson that may be able to guide
American authorities as they investigate the most recent American ATM jackpotting case
that happened in early 2018 and lost over 1 million dollars (see Volz, 2018). Even though
the case is currently under investigation, we speculate the modus operandi used in the
United States would be similar to the FCB case or other international ATM jackpotting
cases. More importantly, the FCB case can be used to expand a routine activities
theoretical framework of ATM hacking where the convergence in physical space,
cyberspace, and time offers an enticing opportunity to commit cyber crime.
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1. The Presence of Motivated Cyber Offenders
At least fifty percent of Asian Pacific institutions reported increasing economic crime as
well as heightened concern about the pervasive and sustained threats of cyber attacks
(PWC, 2014). With the techniques and tools adopted by hackers becoming more
sophisticated, Asian countries such as China, Taiwan, and South Korea with emerging
lucrative markets and increasing use of the Internet are at greater risk of cyber attacks
(Antonescu & Birăub, 2015). Financial service institutions in these countries, for example
the FCB in Taiwan, may have a relatively lower level of cyber security in general
compared to more economically complex countries. As Antonescu and Birăub (2015)
explain, Internet users may still underestimate the vulnerability of “transmission channels”
(e.g. e-mails, chat rooms, discussion forums, social media, messenger, instant messaging or
other online services) that could be utilized for network penetration. As the investigator in
this case, “S” theorized:
…well ‘social engineering’ is still the primary method that hackers would use to
trick you into clicking on something online, maybe an ad, a picture, a posted
thread or a link or an attachment enclosed in email. With a ‘click away’, hackers
can gain access to anything regardless of the distance, a smartphone, electronic
device, computer, server, system, organization, building, absolutely anywhere
within a network. In the FCB case, one alleged explanation for how the hackers
got into a voice recording system in the first place is through ‘spear phishing’
against a specific administrator. This is not about how secure your firewall is. You
would eventually be tricked, and hackers know this and could use your action as
an extension of attacking.

At this point it already appears that the FCB case is consistent with RAT’s first key
component — motivated offenders. The clear pattern of advanced persistent attack (APT)
(see Singer & Friedman, 2013) against carefully selected targets that are likely to have
certain user privileges within the information system makes the motivation of the criminal
group more than evident. None the less, this case is also consistent with Yar (2005)’s
argument that because of the context of cyberspace, it may be much more difficult to
analyze “offenders” under the doctrine of RAT (see Cohen & Felson, 1979). One
possibility is that the existence of motivated FCB cyber criminals could be explained by
virtual proximity distance. Yar (2005) stated that Internet users are often just a few
“clicks” away from many “cyber criminals”. As other studies have demonstrated, in
cyberspace, perpetrators can compromise a victim’s computer and system regardless of
physical contacts and geographical boundaries (Taylor et al., 2006; Eck & Clarke, 2003) as
long as victims activate hidden malware. In this sense, motivated offenders in cyberspace
might not be physically proximate but rather they only need the appropriate attack
opportunity which is the same as conventionally motivated offenders in society (Cohen
and Felson, 1979). As agent “S” explains:
Frankly, motivated cyber criminals are everywhere, just like criminals in the
physical environment… they are out there but again, the fact is the majority of
them almost cannot be identified by us [law enforcement]. Even though
Taiwanese authorities did a good job and solved the FCB case, we did not know
who was behind this incident; that operated and manipulated the FCB’s network.
Still, we are closer to identifying and apprehending more members of the Cobalt
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group than any other country. …Compared to criminals in a physical
environment, cyber criminals benefit from two distinct features of cyberspace,
invisibility and anonymity. This may encourage cyber criminals to commit more
crimes or it may entice criminals in a physical environment to switch to
committing offenses online.

Despite Taiwanese authorities’ success at apprehending three mules from the Cobalt
group within six days and the country’s High Court sentencing them to fines and
incarceration within less than ten months, this swift and certain response may still not
generate enough deterrent effect to offset motivated cyber offenders. For example, soon
after the FCB incident, Far Eastern International Bank in Taiwan was targeted and hackers
attempted to steal 60 million dollars (of which almost all has been recovered) (Reuters,
2017). In a study in Ghana, Danquah and Longe (2011) noted that cyber crimes are
invisible, anonymous and involve flexible identities, as well as lack a formal oversight
system such as police or vigilantes to patrol or watch over the cyber community. In this
sense, the intrinsic nature of cyberspace would reduce the likelihood of being caught by
authorities. In other words, criminals who commit offenses in cyberspace might be able to
extend the timeframe during which they are able to enjoy the rewards of illegal gains due
to inefficient social control mechanisms that are unable to provide the “certainty, celerity
and severity of punishment to compete” with emerging new types of crime and
victimization on the Internet (Cohen & Felson, 1979, p. 605). This may also be one of
reasons that it has been predicted that Taiwan will suffer a substantial number of cyber
attacks (Antonescu & Birăub, 2015).
2. Online Target Suitability and Attractiveness
The FCB case is thought to be one of the first times that the international organized
crime Cobalt group committed an offense in Taiwan. This means that Taiwanese financial
institutions may become more attractive to cyber criminals. First, offenders focused on a
specific ATM model manufactured by a Germany company as the suitable target for using
their programmed malware that triggered the flow of a large amount of cash from ATMs.
Second, cyber criminals exploited the vulnerability of the cyber security defense system
and waited for an opportunity to penetrate the system that was created by negligent
service provisions. As Investigator “S” relates,
...if you are a criminal and you know you are able to infiltrate a large number of
ATMs at once, particularly this type of system (PC 1500XE), and you can
remotely control ATMs to spit out cash for you in a few seconds, don’t you think
this is a very attractive and lucrative gain? And I bet you would want to know
which country uses this ATM model…

The FCB case also demonstrated that certain aspects of prospective targets would
increase the possibility of rewarding a predatory cyber crime. This element, as well as
other collectively weighted factors, is all part of a perpetrator’s rational analysis of target
suitability. Consistent with prior cyber victimization studies, criminals would associate
with victims with certain traits (e.g. demographics, accessibility, visibility) (Reyns, 2013;
Yar, 2005; Marcum et al., 2010), value (Yar, 2005), or online activities and behaviors
(Reyns, 2013; Pratt et al., 2010; van Wilsem, 2013; Marcum et al., 2010; Leukfeldt, 2014)
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in order to facilitate a crime. In this way, agent “S” explains, the net of potential victims
is widened.
…as offenders probe deeper into the network to control ATMs, it is possible that
the FCB would not be the only victim. Everyone who was tricked by this social
engineering should be considered a victim…even if he or she [a victim] did not
lose any personal data or files and their computer is still working just fine, for
hackers, he or she is still a suitable target. At that point of time, he or she might
not be directly linked to financial loss, but might be used to prepare the next
move, which eventually would help offenders to gain something.

Phishing, as an instrumental expression of social engineering, is a routine part of the
process utilized by a majority of cyber criminals to reach prospective victims (Mitnick,
2001; Soudijin & Zegers, 2012). In a national level study for high cyber crime countries,
Kigerl (2012) revealed that overall Europe, Latin America and Asian countries would be
more likely to receive phishing attacks than African countries. In general, phishing is less
dependent on a victim’s demographic and financial characteristics, online accessibility, and
visibility. It seems to be successful as long as hackers can reach any one of a large number
of signals in a pool that have been sent phishing content via e-mail or other online
connections (Leukfeldt, 2014). As reports revealed, Taiwan and other 13 European
countries were targeted by the Cobalt group for this type of cyber attack. Therefore, it
was hypothesized that when hackers were conducting a worldwide search for suitable
access to the specific ATM model they had targeted, the FCB’s London branch
administrator who had clicked a phishing e-mail provided them the initial opportunity to
infiltrate the FCB network (Finkle & Wu, 2017). Future study should explore other
factors and explanations in this regard.
3. Examining Guardianship in Cyberspace
It has been argued that financial intuitions in Taiwan face high risk exposure to cyber
attacks due to social structural and institutional security imbalances (Antonescu & Birăub,
2015). Although institutional and organizational features provide capable formal guardians
(e.g. physical security defense systems, anti-malware software), it is the users’ visibility and
online activities that are usually linked to security vulnerability (Leukfeldt, 2014).
Guardianship like anti-malware physical security systems does not prevent person-based
victimizations that often start with social engineering (Holt & Bossler, 2014). These
vulnerabilities can easily be exploited by hackers contributing to individual victimization
or providing an “infected spot” through which offenders continue to penetrate the system.
This is especially true when there are increases in the use of communication and
information technology, the extension of all different types of online services and activities
supported by using smartphones and other electronic devices with the Internet and
through Wi-Fi accessibility. As “S” was able to explain based on investigations he
conducted on the basic platforms of potential cyber criminal activities,
Levels of cyber security depend on the effectiveness of capable guardians provided
by organizations working together with users for comprehensive cyber
guardianship. Applying ‘cannikin law’ to cyber security, if the capacity of water in
a barrel is determined by the shortest of the wooden staves, then the magnitude of
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cyber guardianship is determined by the weakest security link. Although
companies may continue to upgrade their institutional cyber defense system, they
can still be undermined by employees or ordinary people whose mistakes result in
overall system breaches. People easily make mistakes such as browsing some
unprotected websites or opening some phishing messages. These behaviors will
reduce the magnitude of cyber guardianship.

Consistent with research by Leukfeldt (2014, p. 554), financial intuitions in Taiwan
might not be able to “stop a motivated offender from gaining control over” financial
service systems or customers’ accounts, yet with certain levels of guardianship, the harm
and loss caused by cyber crime could be reduced. In other words, the magnitude of cyber
guardianship could be improved by the collective efforts of users and companies.
In the case of FCB, hackers allegedly obtained access credentials from an administrator
at the London branch through phishing rather than breaching a physical cyber defense
system. From a cyber security perspective, this highlights the problems of personal
guardianship (see Leukfeldt & Yar, 2016; Williams, 2016). As in prior studies, personal
capable guardianship (i.e. a user’s online behavior) is critical in reducing the harm caused
by cyber criminals. For instance, users who are aware of the risks of online activities or
have some level of technical computer knowledge were less likely to be victims of hacking
(Leukfeldt & Yar, 2016). This concept was reinforced by agent “S”.
…I would say, theoretically there are no really ‘strong enough’ capable guardians
in cyberspace to protect users and institutions and to prevent future attacks and
realistically, we won’t be able to fully stop the potential threat of attacks. In the
FCB case for example, I mean if an invisible and anonymous hacker who
purposely wants to penetrate a company or steal your information, how would we
know that in advance? The odds are really low, right?
Otherwise they wouldn’t be called a ‘hacker’. In fact, a majority of victims do not
know they have been attacked until they have been informed by authorities or
companies… a user’s online behavior creates vulnerability and could be exploited
by motivated offenders…

While it may sound true that if people do not use the Internet for any activities (e.g.
shopping, browsing websites, downloading files/music/video, e-mail, messaging), then
there would be no cyber crime or cyber victimization, this is an unreal expectation in our
society today. For most people, it is nearly impossible not to use the Internet throughout
daily life – even traditional line-telephone service switches to Internet technology.
Although users and organizations cannot eliminate the risks of being cyber attacked,
Williams (2016) states that using both or either physical guardianship and personal
guardianship would frustrate cyber criminals and reduce the likelihood of being victimized
in cyberspace.
Conclusion
The current study addressed three elements of RAT theory in the context of cyber
crime. Support was found for the idea that motivated cyber offenders are out there
assessing online target suitability and attractiveness and are most likely to commit offenses
when there is insufficient capable guardianship in cyberspace. Using the recent case of a
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FCB ATM heist in Taiwan, we were able to examine a type of victimization that is
different from previous studies (Argun, & Dağlar, 2016; Breetzke & Cohn, 2013; Choi,
2008; Groff, 2007; Holtfreter, Reisig, & Pratt, 2008; Kigerl, 2012; Louderback & Roy,
2018; Mustaine, & Tewksbury, 1998; Spano, & Nagy, 2005; Tewksbury, & Mustaine,
2000). For a majority of motivated hackers, financial gain is still the primary and ultimate
goal through the phishing process or by installing malware to obtain data and information
from victims. Also, financial institutions and users may not be able to stop motivated
offenders as RAT assumes, because we are less likely to know where and who these
criminals are until after they commit an offense. It can be argued that without capable
cyber guardianship, the odds of network penetration and victimization will not only
increase but so will the opportunity for an offender’s escape in cyberspace (Jaishankar,
2008).
The costs incurred with offenses such as the current case are not limited to the direct
costs of money stolen. On the day of the incident, the FCB froze 1,000 ATMs and
stopped the service of withdrawals which no doubt cost the public and general commerce
significant inconveniences. These costs could be considered secondary losses from the
overdrawn ATMs (see Anderson et al., 2013). After the investigation, it was determined
that approximately 4 percent of the 27,200 machines in their ATM network in Taiwan
might have been affected by the cyber-attack and needed further inspection (Reuters,
2016). Also, the system and software of the FCB in Taiwan may have to be upgraded and
additional training provided to encourage employee awareness measures. These
consequences represent additional defensive costs. In addition, the hacking incident could
possibly undermine citizen confidence in the bank and online banking in general as well as
damage the image and reputation of financial service institutions; all of which can be
considered indirect costs. The direct and indirect costs to society of hacking incidents such
as these are not easy to accurately estimate as Anderson and associates (2013) indicate,
however their impact on individuals, organizations, the criminal justice system and the
society as a whole would be substantial. Thus the current study offers some policy
implications to improve cyber security and cyber crime control.
First, institutions have to keep their operating system and basic software up to date and
keep upgrading and enhancing computer physical defense systems such as installing anti-virus
software, using firewalls and email spam filtering, malware detection, securing browsing,
networking activities monitoring and patching potential threats of bugs and holes. While
implementing network security may be costly, there is no magic number that one should
spend to reach and maintain adequate levels of security that ensure a hack-free system.
Realistically, a company should find the balance between cost or affordability and the
processes necessary to maintain guardianship against data breaches and system
compromises.
Second, an enterprise should work with IT special consultants and cyber security
mangers and develop guidelines that address prevention and defenses, as well as a response and
recovery plan. Businesses should hold user cyber security training to protect their intranet and
internet at all employee and administrative levels. This plan should be able to provide basic
cyber security knowledge to users within the company and prevent cyber security
negligence. The defense system should assess and detect data or network breaches, virus
infections or any security threats at their initial stages. With periodic internal users’
training and system drilling, the enterprise should be able to respond with appropriate
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strategies to stop cyber vulnerability and minimize potential losses. After identifying
attacks, the company should be able to conduct damage control and assessment as well as
implement approaches to recover system losses and to repair the affected network and
system. Furthermore, they should hold cyber security meetings routinely to update
relevant members about cyber security and prevention plans.
Third, given increasing trends toward the use of electronics in daily life, cyber crime
and victimization may occur more often merely because more individual devices are
connected to the Internet (Singer & Friedman, 2013). Consequently, strengthening non-work
place personal guardianship is critical for preventing victimization. As expected, work place
related network and computer security policies are more stringent than non-work places
and may help to restrain individual online behaviors (Williams, 2016). However, online
users in non-work place settings (e.g. homes, restaurants, airports, cafés) may have more
unprotected exchanges which increase the odds of being victimized in cyberspace. In nonwork settings, users should not plug-in thumb drives without encryption; activate
unsecured devices to browse websites, nor update computer software frequently, using
passwords that are easy to guess. In addition, they should avoid having inappropriate
security settings and arbitrarily downing free files and installing downloaded applications
that may contain undetected malware.
Fourth, although cyberspace has been viewed as a virtual space with “zero distance”
between all points that does not mean that crime “hotspots” cannot be located there as it
is in physical space like street corners or parks. An IP address in cyberspace can be viewed
much like locations in the physical environment and one could even pin point a certain
machine with a permanent or temporary address where it can be exploited by offenders in
cyberspace. Therefore, changing user’s online risky behaviors through re-education on security
and making people aware of the threats of cyber victimization could also enhance cyber crime
prevention. Users should be aware that certain online activities, for instance, spending too
much time online shopping and banking, watching pictures and videos that may have
contain malware, playing video games, downloading music and media that may have
viruses, and accessing social media, chatting in online rooms, forums and chat boxes
would disproportionately increase their online visibility. Subsequent interaction with
potential offenders would expose them to the risk of becoming a suitable target in
cyberspace.
And finally, we need more research on different cases to understand types of cyber
crime and cyber victimization in order to become more effective both formally and
informally with mechanisms to prevent potential cyber crime threats. Even though this
may be very difficult to do given the nature of cyberspace where deterrence may be
harder to achieve, enhancing social and community cohesion may reduce some high risk
behaviors. As Jaishankar (2008) posits, cyber crime may be reduced with more selfregulation, bounded by integrity and honesty as reflected in moral standards and ethical
principles. Enhancing civic virtue, responsibly and the expectations of being law-abiding
citizens may alleviate some of the root causes of not only cyber crime but also all other
types of crime as well.
Limitations
The current case study extends the theoretical framework of RAT to the domain of the
victimization of financial institutions and provides another piece of evidence indicating
that such an approach can be a useful framework for understanding the victimization of
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financial institutions involving hacking. Still, it may be argued that the case study method
does not use conventional statistical analysis as prior studies have (Argun, &Dağlar, 2016;
Breetzke & Cohn, 2013; Holtfreter et al., 2008; Louderback & Roy, 2018; Mustaine, &
Tewksbury, 1998) and is a less reliable form of evidence for theorizing about cyber
criminology. However, the current study is still valuable and contributes to the field for a
number of reasons. First, none of prior studies examined cyber ATM hacking and little is
known about this type of cyber victimization. Given a subsequent high-profile ATM
jackpotting heist activity in the Unites States (Volz, 2018), the current case study sheds
light on the modus operandi of ATM hacking as well as the factors that may be associated
with elements of RAT in a virtual environment. Second, although cases of cyber ATM
hacking are relatively rare compared to other types of cyber crime such as phishing, spam
identify theft, and fraud, they may involve substantial sums of money and risk
undermining a common commerce function that most people participate in. Third, this is
not just a national case for Taiwanese authorities but also an international case worthy of
attention regarding modus operandi and prevention of ATM hacking (Sancho et al.,
2017). This analysis may be useful for theorizing about organized crime, comparative
criminal justice and computer software design. Given the current study’s limitations as a
case study based on qualitative interviews, more research is needed to better understand
cyber ATM hacking. After cumulating enough cases, we may further examine this type of
victimization by using quantitative approaches.
Although the applicability of RAT might be limited in cyber crime due to spatiotemporal disorganization and the argument that it is not easy to demonstrate how cyber
criminals and victims “converge in space and time” as noted by Yar (2005, p. 424), the
current study using the broader doctrine of RAT found support for the essence of RAT
particularly the three basic elements of crime. These findings are consistent with prior
studies in cyber criminology (Argun, & Dağlar, 2016; Breetzke & Cohn, 2013; Holtfreter
et al., 2008; Louderback & Roy, 2018; Mustaine, & Tewksbury, 1998). Future study
should continue to explore how routine activities theory could be applied to cyberspace
or even whether or not to develop other theoretical explanations about cyber
victimization.
Applying the elements of RAT might be a simplistic conceptualization of cyber crime;
however, as discussed above, its applicability was supported by the current case study and
other prior quantitative studies analyzing larger victimization databases. Moreover,
analyzing this FCB case in a RAT framework would helps us to understand particular
patterns in offending over time and cyberspace that could not be tracked by aggregated
victimization data. The current case study further allows crime prevention specialists to
design strategies that could specifically address cyber offender behavior, reducing
motivation and increasing deterrence in the near future. Or, efforts could focus on
potential targets, educating and engaging victims in protection as well as risk avoidance.
And finally, resources could be directed at determining which options would be the most
effective for the use of a wide range of guardians or guardian-like instruments). All of
these strategies are consistent with the framework of RAT.
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